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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1955
In order -to avoid the problem of determining whether oil or gas is be-
ing produced in paying quantities, oil and gas leases should provide that
after the initial five-year period, the lessor shall have the option of cancelling
the lease upon the payment of an amount to be determined by multiplying
by a stated number the -total value of all oil and gas produced during the
twelve months which preceded the exercise of the option.
Condition Precedent in Form of Condition Subsequent
The court of appeals in Kallins v. Rexi held that a provision in a five-
year lease that the lease will be null and void if "it is impossible to secure
approval by the Zoning Board of lessee's occupancy" is a condition prece-
dent.3 Therefore, the five-year lease never became effective though lessee
was granted a temporary permit by the Zoning Board of Appeals. The real
estate broker who obtained the tenant claimed a commission of five percent
of the rental to be paid during the five years. The lower court gave judg-
ment for the broker in an amount equal to five percent of the rental paid
prior to suit without prejudice to a suit for any additional installments
which might accrue. The court of appeals restricted the judgment for
plaintiff to five percent of the rental for two years. The statement by
Judge Hurd that if the tenant continues to occupy the premises, then plain-
tiff as the broker who obtained the tenant should be entitled to five percent
of the rental seems reasonable.
Tenant at Will: Rental
The court of appeals in Vangrow v. Weiss4 allowed the landlord to
recover on an implied promise the rental which the landlord had informed
a tenant at will would be due if the tenant continued in possession after a
certain date. There was evidence that the rental demanded was the reas-
onable rental of the property. Consequently, the amount recovered would
have been the same if the action had -been -brought on quantum meruit.
ROBERT N. COOK
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Municipal Corporations as Political Subdivisions
of the State Government
The Ohio Revised Code provides that an appeal bond may not be re-
quired when the appellant is "the state [or] any political subdivision
2125 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio App. 1955).
3
"Words are often used ... the literal meaning of which would make some fact a
condition subsequent to the duty of immediate performance, though the parties really
mean to make its non-occurence a condition precedent to such duty," RBSTATBMENT,
CONTRACTs S 259, comment a (1932).
' 128 N.E.2d 822 (Ohio App. 1953).
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thereof authorized to sue and be sued."' In 1928 an appellate court had
held2 that a city was not within the provisions of the section as it then
read. Subsequently the statute was amended to add the words, "political
subdivision." In Wolf v. City of Columbus3 the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County held that municipal corporations, in carrying out many
governmental functions, constitute agencies or instrumentalities of the
state government, constitute "political subdivisions" of the state, and are
within the terms of the statute's exemption.
Transition from Village to City
Status - Special Census
The Ohio Constitution establishes the distinction between cities and
villages.4 Its provisions are not self-executing, and the actual method of
transition from one to the other depends upon the passage by the legisla-
ture of statutes regulating transition. The legislature has done so.6 Ohio
Revised Code sections 703.01 and 703.06 provide for the transition to be
made as the result of "any federal census."
The question arose, in State ex rel. Brubaker v. Brown,7 whether a special
census made by the Federal Bureau of the Census as provided by the United
States Code,8 at the express request of the mayor of an Ohio village, and
the result of which showed the municipal population to be in excess of
5,000, entitled the corporation as of right to be proclaimed by the Secretary
of State to be a city. Why the corporation desired a hurried advancement
to such status does not appear. There are certainly some financial disad-
vantages to city status, such as loss of road maintenance by the county.
But the village of Kettering desired .the transition to -take place without
waiting for the 1960 decennial census, and the Supreme Court held it to
be entitled to it. The applicable statutes are not entirely free from am-
biguity, but the court properly held -that it should be resolved in favor of
expediting rather than delaying the transition, in order to bring about the
expressed primary intent of the constitution that all municipal corporations
having a population in excess of 5000 should be cities.
1 OHIo REv. CODE § 2505.12 (B).
Steubenville v. Reiner, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 324 (Ohio App. 1928).
S129 N.E.2d 309 Ohio App. (1954).
• ART. XVIII, §j 1.
5Ibid. See Murry v. State ex rel. Nestor, 91 Ohio St. 220, 110 N.E. 471 (1915).
OHio REv. CODE c. 703.
'163 Ohio St. 241, 126 N.E.2d 439 (1955).
846 STAT. 25, 13 U.S.C. § 218 (1929).
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Incorporation and Annexation: Priority of Proceedings
Frequently it happens in unincorporated areas which are approaching
the necessity of acquiring corporate status, that two opposing factions may
be found. One desires annexation to an established adjoining municipal
corporation; the other advocates independent incorporation. A race of
diligence often results. The statutes provide for two primary and one sel-
dom used method of incorporation and for one method of annexation of
unincorporated territory. In State ex rel. Store v. County Commissiorrs9
a group of inhabitants of an unincorporated area had petitioned the town-
ship trustees for incorporation. The trustees had taken no action, and a
writ of mandamus had been issued requiring them to proceed with an
election. A month or so after -the filing of the petition with the trustees,
but prior to the holding of the said election, an adjoining city filed with
the County Commissioners and the Board of Elections proceedings to
bring about an election in the same area on the question of annexing it.
The court of appeals granted an injunction to restrain any further
proceedings on annexation until the election had been held on the ques-
tion of incorporation. It relied for its authority upon a precedent in which
the converse situation had been presented and in which proceedings for
incorporation pending before the County Commissioners had been held
to constitute grounds for enjoining subsequently filed proceedings for the
same purpose before the township trustees. The result seems logical, just
and in accord with the general rule that when there exist courts or other
bodies of concurrent jurisdiction the one which first obtains jurisdiction is
entitled to proceed free from interference.10
Ordinance Restricting Use of Streets
By Trucks Held Unreasonable
The B. Trucking Company had its principal place of business in an
area of Cleveland zoned for factory purposes. Its trucks were engaged in
hauling stone for the construction of the Ohio Turnpike, and it was "neces-
sary" that this operation, and the consequent servicing of trucking equip-
ment operate on a 24-hour basis. There existed residences on the four
streets forming the square in which the trucking company's garage was
located. Apparently acting at the instance of said residents, the Cleve-
land City Council enacted an ordinance which prohibited the operation of
trucks of gross weight in excess of four tons on any of the four streets be-
tween the hours of 10 P. M. and 6 A. M. It was conceded that the ordi-
' 124 N.E.2d 836 (Ohio App. 1952).
'For an interesting case on a similar issue see State ex rel. Ferris v. Shaver, 163
Ohio St. 325, 126 N.E.2d 915 (1955).
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nance, if valid, prevented the operation of the trucking company's business
between those hours.
Defendant was a driver for the trucking company. He was arrested
under the ordinance for operating an empty truck weighing in excess of
four-tons gross, at a lawful speed, in a careful manner, with a minimum
of noise, on one of the four proscribed streets within the proscribed hours.
The gravamen of the offense was the operation of the truck on the forbidden
streets within the forbidden period.
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County declared the ordinance
unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional."
It held that an ordinance which arbitrarily prohibited the use of these streets,
and denied the employer and his employee access to their place of business,
without regard to the mtmenr of their going and coming insofar as excess
noise or unsafe operation were concerned, bore no reasonable relationship
to the preservation of the public health, morals, safety and general welfare.
Basically, said the court, it was like an ordinance regulating working hours,12
and unconstitutional for the same reason.
Political Activity by Municipal Employees
Section 143.41 of the Revised Code of Ohio contains various prohibi-
tions upon the activities of officers or employees in the classified service
of the state, counties, cities and city school districts. Among them is a pro-
vision forbidding such employees to "take part in politics."
Firemen in Shaker Heights, in the classified civil service of that city,
sought by initiative petition to place before its council and electorate an
ordinance which would establish therein the "three-platoon system" in
its fire department. The question was raised whether the circulation of
such petitions, the procuring of signatures of qualified electors thereto and
the presentation of such petitions to council in accordance with municipal
charter provisions constituted political activity by the firemen in violation
of the Ohio statute.
The Supreme Court held,13 one member abstaining, that this activity by
the firemen was proper. It conceded that the word "politics" or the ex-
pression "political activity," as used in the statute, was susceptible of two
meanings. The first meaning to be attributed to it is a broad one, that
of public administration and the science of government. The second mean-
ing is a narrower one, that of partisan politics, the securing of public office
and the winning of elections for partisan purposes.
' Cleveland v. Antonio, 124 N.E.2d 846 (1955).
" Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
" Heidtman v. Shaker Heights, 163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138 (1955).
UJune
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The court held that it is only the activity encompassed in the latter
meaning which is forbidden by the statute. While in the future, situa-
tions closer to the border line between the two meanings will undoubtedly
arise, the decision in this case seems clearly to be correct. A denial of the
right to petition one's elected officials for the redress of grievances ought
not to be read by implication into any such a statute, and should only be
enforced if the intention of the legislature is dear beyond doubt. And
even then there is some doubt whether such a prohibition would be con-
stitutional.
Municipal Income Taxes
Preemption by State
The Supreme Court held in Ohio Finance Co. v. Toledo,14 that the
state tax law,' 5 providing generally for a tax, against the owner, of 5 per
cent on the income yield from his intangibles, and for the taxation of the
shares of a dealer in intangibles, at 5 mills on their fair value, and that such
latter tax should be in lieu of all other taxes on intangibles owned by such
dealer, was a premption of the field by the legislature, so that a municipal
ordinance imposing an income tax on the portion of the income of such
dealer from such intangibles was invalid. The case is more fully discussed
in its tax implications elsewhere in this survey.' 6
City Water Supply - Fluoridation
In Kraus v. Cleveland17 the Supreme Court ruled that prevention and
control of dental caries is a proper subject for legislation by a municipal
council in relation to public health and an ordinance of such a council pro-
viding for the fluoridation of water by a municipal water department is
within the city's police power, does not infringe upon the constitutional
liberties of the citizens and does not contravene the general laws in rela-
tion to adulteration or the practice of medicine. The constitutional aspects
of the case are discussed elsewhere in this survey.' 8
Charter Provisions May Override
State Prevailing Wage Law
Ohio Revised Code sections 4115.03 et seq., known as the Prevailing
Wage Law, provide in substance that persons employed in the construction
1163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.B.2d 731 (1955).
1 Omo R v. CoDE §§ 5701.06, 5711.01, 5711.03.
"'See infra, p. 000.
'7163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
See supra. p. 000.
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of any public improvement by any political subdivision of the state19 may
not be paid less than the "prevailing wage rate" of mechanics and laborers
for the class of work called for by the nature of -the improvement in the
locality where the work is to be performed, as determined by the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations. Contracts entered into by such subdivisions
must contain provisions whereby the successful bidder and his subcon-
tractors agree to pay at least such prevailing wages.
In Craig v. YoangstownP2 the Supreme Court had before it a situation
involving the construction by that city of water mains. Work was per-
formed by its own employees, members of its classified civil service.
Youngstown has a charter, which, in one of its provisions, declares that
"the council shall fix by ordinance the salary or compensation of all officers
and employees of the city government." The compensation paid to mem-
bers of the classified civil service in the city's street department, who were
doing the work, had been fixed by ordinance and was less than that provided
under the Prevailing Wage Law.
The Supreme Court held that the wages paid by the city were not con-
trolled by the Prevailing Wage Law. First of all, no problem of state legis-
lation affecting local police, sanitary or other similar regulation is involved.
The home rule powers of the city under the constitution would govern.2 1
To force upon cities rates established by negotiations between private con-
tractors and labor unions would be to deprive the city of its power under
the constitution and the statute relating to non-charter municipalities, em-
powering their councils to fix rates of compensation for employees.
2 2
Second, the constitutional provision2a authorizing the passage of laws
fixing and regulating the hours of labor and establishing a minimum wage
is not in issue in -this case, since the Prevailing Wage Law does not purport
to fix minimum wages. That has been done by entirely separate statutes.24
Construction of County Subway System
For Use by Municipally-Owned Rapid Transit
The space limitations of this survey forbid any extensive discussion of a
highly important case2 5 decided in an original mandamus action by the
Supreme Court involving the constitutionality of the County Subway
"See note 3 supra.
162 Ohio St. 215, 123 N.E.2d 19 (1954).
2 1ART. XVIII, § 3.
"Oio REv. CODE § 731.08.
'ART. II, Sec. 34.
" OHIO REv. CODE §§ 4111.01-4111.16.
'State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159, 126 N.E.2d 449 (1955).
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